We investigate the implications of the separability principle in the context of bargaining. For two bargaining problems with the same population, suppose that there is a subgroup of agents who receive the same payoffs in both bargaining problems. Moreover, if we imagine the departure of this...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Social Choice and Welfare', 2012, 38, 519-529.<P> We investigate the implications of imposing balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction in the context of sequencing problems. Balanced consistency requires that the effect on the payoff from...</p>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'Journal of Economic Theory', 2014, 153, 33-45.<P> Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where...</p>

We introduce a family of sequential contributions rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems. Each member of the family assigns an agent part of the cost of connecting him to his immediate predecessor, and all of his followers are equally responsible for the remaining part. We characterize...