The Kyoto Protocol allows international emissions trading, which could take place in three different forms: government, permit, or credit trading. Which trading system is chosen is likely to depend on the preferences of several interest groups. In this paper, we give empirical evidence on the...

One crucial precondition for the overall achievement of the Kyoto Protocol by 2010 is the participation of the USA. According to political economy theory, big countries have the strongest incentives to provide global collective good provisions. Reality, however, does not seem to follow this...

How should green taxation be designed so that it accommodates producer interests? We argue that to design green taxes which are high enough to have the desired incentive effects, tax revenues must be reimbursed, either by earmarking them for environmental subsidies or by reducing other taxes...

Has the EU Directive Proposal on CO2 trade been influenced by lobbyism and can it be improved? After hypothesizing how the EU may be vulnerable to lobbyism and why industrial groups have a strong incentive to lobby for favourable environmental regulation, we turn to empirical evidence concerning...

The transition of the »Old Communist« countries of East and Central Europe has been disappointingly slow given the amount of physical and human capital available at the start of the <p> transition. We argue that this slowness is caused by the lack of social capital, which is an <p> important factor...</p></p>