Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving parents selection options while maintaining diversity of di fferent student types. In practice, diversity constraints are often enforced by setting hard upper bounds and hard lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate that, with hard...

Ehlers and Klaus (2003) study so-called house allocation problems and claim to characterize all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity on two preference domains (Ehlers and Klaus, 2003, Theorem 1). They explicitly prove Theorem 1 for preference...

It is known that there are school choice problems without an efficient and stable assignment. We consider comparing assignments in terms of their stability by comparing their sets of blocking (student-school) pairs or comparing their sets of blocking students who are involved in at least one...

Consider a setting in which individual strict preferences need to be aggregated into a social strict preference relation. For two alternatives and an odd number of agents, it follows from May’s Theorem that the majority aggregation rule is the only one satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and...