We characterize the set of strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. The set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set with a finite number of elements. We do not require the SCFs to be ‘onto’, but instead impose the weaker...

A fair division problem with indivisible objects, e.g. jobs, and one divisible good (money) is considered. The individuals consume one object and money. The class of strategy-proof and fair allocation rules is characterized. The allocation rules in the class are like a Vickrey auction bossy and...

We extend the Shapley-Scarf (1974) model - where a finite number of indivisible objects is to be allocated among a finite number of individuals - to the case where the primary endowment set of an individual may contain none, one, or several objects and where property rights may be transferred...

Strategy-proof allocation of a finite number of indivisible goods among a finite number of individuals is considered. The main result is that in a pure distributional case, a mechanism is strategy-proof, nonbossy and neutral if and only if it is serially dictatorial. If the indivisible goods are...

A model of occupational choice is considered. Due to incomplete and asymmetric information, various individuals have different sets of choice. Conceivable definitions of fair wages are discussed and analyzed. Existence of a fair wage structure is proved in a formal model where occupation is...

Consistency between Pareto optimality and no envy requires some assumptions on the structure of the set of Pareto optimal allocations. Here the author proves that sigma-optimality--a concept first introduced by D. Campbell in his 1988 paper--is a sufficient condition. Campbell proved the...

The concept of a lower bound on optimal linear taxes is analyzed. A marginal tax rate is defined to be optimal if the corresponding state of the economy is a welfare maximum for some social welfare function reflecting at least a minimal aversion to inequality. The lower bound on optimal tax...