This paper explores price formation when sellers are privately informed about their preferences and the quality of their asset. There are many equilibria, including a semi- separating one in which each seller's price depends on a one-dimensional index of her preferences and asset quality. This...

We study an economy with segmented financial markets and strategic arbitrageurs who link these markets. We show that the equilibrium of the arbitraged economy is asymptotically Walrasian in the sense that it converges to the equilibrium of an appropriately defined competitive economy with no...

We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We survey the articles on discrete resource allocation problems, their solutions, and their applications in three related domains. The first domain gives the theoretical background regarding the basic models,...

We investigate an assignment market in which multiple objects are assigned, together with associated payments, to a group of agents with unit demand preferences. Preferences over bundles, the pairs of (object, payment), accommodate income effects. Among all (Walrasian) equilibria in such a...

We develop an equilibrium model for residential housing transactions in an economy with houses that differ in their quality and households that differ in their planned holding horizon. We show that, in equilibrium, clientele effect persists, with long-horizon buyers overwhelmingly choosing...