While the too-big-to-fail guarantee is explicitly a part of bank regulation in many countries, this paper shows that bank closure policies also suffer from an implicit too-many-to-fail problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or...

As a result of the recent financial crisis, there has been significant public debate on the role of the financial sector in bringing about the ""Great Depression."" More generally, there has been debate about whether the current industry structure has enhanced social welfare or served a...

The financial collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008 led to one of the most sweeping government interventions in private financial markets in history. The bailout has already cost American taxpayers close to 150 billion, and substantially more will be needed. The U.S. economy--and by...

We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by...

We examine deal-level data from 395 private equity transactions in Western Europe initiated by large private equity houses during the period 1991 to 2007. We un-lever the deal-level equity return and adjust for un-levered return to quoted peers to extract a measure of abnormal performance of the...

We consider liquidity transfers between banks through the inter-bank borrowing and asset sale markets when banks providing liquidity may have market power and assets may be bank-specific. We show that when the outside options of liquidity-affected banks are weak, surplus banks may strategically...

We study liquidity transfers between banks through the interbank borrowing and asset sale markets when (i) surplus banks providing liquidity have market power, (ii) there are frictions in the lending market due to moral hazard, and (iii) assets are bank-specific. We show that when the outside...

We build an equilibrium model with commodity producers who are averse to future cash flow variability, and hedge using futures. Their hedging demand is met by risk-constrained speculators. Increases in producers' hedging demand (speculators' risk- capacity) increase hedging costs via...

We argue that when bankruptcy code is creditor-friendly, excessive liquidationscause levered firms to shun innovation, whereas by promoting continuation upon failure,a debtor-friendly code induces greater innovation. We provide empirical support for thisclaim by employing patents as a proxy for...