Motivated by the literature on limits-to-arbitrage, we build an equilibrium model of commodity markets in which speculators are capital constrained, and commodity producers have hedging demands for commodity futures. Increases (decreases) in producers' hedging demand (speculators' risk capacity)...

We study liquidity transfers between banks through the interbank borrowing and asset sale markets when(i)surplus banks providing liquidity have market power, ii)there are frictions in the lending market due to moral hazard, and(iii)assets are bank-specific. We show that when the outside options...

We address the paradox that financial innovations aimed at risk-sharing appear to have made the world riskier. Financial innovations facilitate hedging idiosyncratic risks among agents; however, aggregate risks can be hedged only with liquid assets. When risk-sharing is primitive, agents...

Infrastructure projects involve multiple parties: a government, private sector firms that build and manage, and outside investors who supply financing. Private sector firms need incentives to implement and maintain the projects well; governments may lack commitment not to extort cash flows (for...

We consider a moral hazard setup wherein leveraged firms have incentives to take on excessive risks and are thus rationed when they attempt to roll over debt. Firms can sell assets to alleviate rationing. Liquidated assets are purchased by non-rationed firms but their borrowing capacity is also...

We document that the deregulation of bank branching restrictions in the United States triggered a reallocation across sectors, with end effects on state-level volatility. This change in state-level volatility cannot be explained simply by shifts in sector-level returns and volatility. A...

Financial crises are often accompanied by an outflow of foreign portfolio investment and an inflow of foreign direct investment(FDI). We provide an agency-theoretic framework that explains this phenomenon. We show that during crises, agency problems affecting domestic firms are exacerbated, and,...

We document capital misallocation in the U.S. investment-grade (IG) corporate bond market, driven by quantitative easing (QE). Prospective fallen angels -- risky firms just above the IG rating cutoff -- enjoyed subsidized bond financing since 2009, especially when the scale of QE purchases...

We show that cheap credit to impaired firms has a disinflationary effect. By helping distressed firms to stay afloat, “zombie credit” can create excess production capacity, and in turn, put downward pressure on markups and prices. We test this mechanism exploiting granular inflation and...

We show theoretically and empirically that in the presence of a time-varying cost of capital (COC), firms have a hedging motive to reduce the overall COC over time by saving cash when COC is relatively low. The sensitivity of cash savings to COC is especially pronounced with respect to the cost...