There has emerged in the Western economies a strong nexus between the credit risks of financial sectors and their sovereigns. We argue that this phenomenon can be understood in the context of two debt overhang problems: one affecting the financial sector due to its under-capitalisation following...

Derivatives exposures across large financial institutions often contribute to – if not necessarily create – systemic risk. Current reporting standards for derivatives exposures are nevertheless inadequate for assessing these systemic risk contributions. In this paper, the author explains how...

We document that the deregulation of bank branching restrictions in theUnited States triggered a reallocation across sectors, with end effectson state-level volatility. This change in state-level volatility cannotbe explained simply by shifts in sector-level returns and volatility. Areallocation...

We consider a moral hazard setup wherein leveraged firms have incentivesto take on excessive risks and are thus rationed when they attempt toroll over debt. Firms can sell assets to alleviate rationing. Liquidatedassets are purchased by non-rationed firms but their borrowing capacityis also...

We examine how the banking sector may ignite the formation of assetprice bubbles when there is access to abundant liquidity. Inside banks,given lack of observability of effort, loan officers (or risk takers)are compensated based on the volume of loans but are penalized if bankssuffer a high...

Using unsecured bonds traded in the U.S. between 1990 and 2012, we find that bond credit spreads are sensitive to risk for most financial institutions, but not for the largest financial institutions. This “too big to fail” relation between firm size and the risk sensitivity of bond spreads...

Banks' leverage choices represent a delicate balancing act. Credit discipline argues for more leverage, while balance-sheet opacity and ease of asset substitution argue for less. Meanwhile, regulatory safety nets promote ex post financial stability, but also create perverse incentives for banks...

We present a model where firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha") and managers are risk-averse. When managers cannot move across firms after being hired, employers learn about their talent, allocate them efficiently to projects and provide insurance to low-quality managers. When...