instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

We provide evidence on the match between firms, managers and incentives using a new survey designed for this purpose … managers are heterogeneous. Following the sources of heterogeneity observed in the data, we assume that firms differ by … than non-family firms. Managers differ in their degree of risk aversion and talent. The entry of firms and managers, the …

focuses on developing a theoretical framework for process design in order to provide some guidelines for managers. The …

We examine the relationship between the employment and compensation of managers and CEOs and the presence of a … monitoring, which requires more managers. The model also assumes rent sharing between workers, managers and the owners of the … firm. Unions, by redistributing rents towards the workers, lead to lower employment and lower pay for managers. Using a …

is delegated to a cohort of full?time executives, there needs to be “good” managers. In Britain, however, ownership …

. Managers who were socialised in state socialist combines are still a large proportion of East German economic elites. Owing to …

among leaders of private than state-owned companies, and less typical among managers of foreign than Hungarian companies …

similarities and differences. Then I use it to explain how fund managers can take investment decisions within the well-known Mean …