Are prices or quantities the best regulatory instrument to align private actions with public interests in the presence of externalities? We add another dimension to this ongoing debate by experimentally analyzing the interaction between instrument choice and intrinsic motivation of regulated...

We provide the first estimate of the money equivalent of procedural changes in public assistance programs. Observing 77,305 appliance replacement decisions in an energy efficiency assistance program targeting low-income households, our RDD design exploits two quasi-exogenous temporal...

Punishment institutions for curtailing free-riding in social dilemmas rely on information about individuals’ behavior collected through monitoring. We contribute to the experimental study of cooperation-enhancing institutions by examining how cooperation and efficiency in a social dilemma...

This paper studies temporal factors influencing the effectiveness of don't drive appeals (DDAs) which policy-makers use to encourage motorists to voluntarily reduce driving during transitory high pollution episodes. We derive and empirically validate a theoretical framework for DDAs where the...

Many industrialized countries have recognized the need to mitigate energy cost increases faced by low-income households by fostering the adoption of energy-efficient technologies. How to meet this need is an open question, but “behavioral insights” are likely components of future policy...

Like many common-pool resources, the Lake Victoria fisheries are characterized by poor compliance with production input regulations that are intended to reduce overexploitation. To explore the use of input subsidies to increase compliance, we determine the subsidy level required to induce demand...

This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with endogenous information structures: Players are uninformed whether the target player cooperated or defected at the cooperation stage, but can decide to resolve the information...