We report the results of voluntary contributions experiments where subjects are randomly assigned different rates of return from their private consumption. These random assignments are changed round to round, enabling the measurement of individual player contribution rates as a function of that...

Experimental research on individual decision-making with respect to effort is an important stream in management accounting research. There are two different concepts to operate effort in laboratory experiments, real effort, where participants are asked to perform an experimental task and chosen...

It has been suggested that players often produce simplified and/or misspecified mental representations of interactive decision problems (Kreps, 1990). We submit that the relational structure of players' preferences in a game induces cognitive complexity, and may be an important driver of such...

This paper discusses the behavioural e ffects of cognitive dissonance in conjunction with cooperative social norms and highlights their relevance for the interpretation of (non)cooperative behaviour in economic lab experiments. In particular, it is argued that, if subjects are used to...

Experimental economists frequently invoke Adam Smith's notion of sympathy, and experimental treatments typically examine sympathy in situations where two groups are involved. We explore additional implications of sympathy suggested by the work of later classical economists. We link the notion of...

In this paper, we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ. Beh., 1990). Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence. Theory predicts simultaneous production in...

This paper provides a comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. We vary systematically the effectiveness of punishment, that is, the factor by which punishment reduces the punished player's income, and we find that contributions to the public good increase...

This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the theoretical observations that both the violations of competitive risk-neutral firms and the marginal effectiveness of increased enforcement across firms are independent of differences in their abatement costs and their initial allocations of...