This paper studies the second-best problem where not all links of a congestedtransportation network can be tolled. The second-best tax rule for thisproblem is derived for general static networks, so that the solution presentedis valid for any graph of the network and any set of tolling points...

Urban re-development projects may generate various positive as well as negative spatial externalities to the existing population in a given area. This study aims to assess the order of magnitude of the expected net benefits for incumbent residents from a large scale project in the Southern part...

See also the publication in the <A HREF="http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/lse/jtep/2014/00000048/00000002/art00005">'Journal of Transport Economics and Policy'</A>, 2014, 48(2), 261-277.<P> We formulate a horizontal differentiation model with price-sensitive demand and asymmetric transport costs, in the context of transport scheduling. Two competitors choose fares and departure times...</p></a>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119013000594"><I>Journal of Urban Economics</I></A>, 2014, 13-27.<P> This paper analyzes efficient pricing at a congested airport dominated by a single firm. Unlike much of the previous literature, we combine a dynamic (bottleneck) model of congestion and a vertical...</p></i></a>

Mohring and Harwitz (1962) showed that, under certain conditions, an optimally designed and priced road would generate user toll revenues just sufficient to cover its capital costs. Several scholars subsequently explored the robustness of that finding. This paper briefly summarizes further...

We study interaction between the trips of two types of drivers on a two-lane road who differ by their desired speeds. The difference in desired speeds causes congestion, because slow drivers force fast drivers to reduce their speed. An interesting aspect of this type of congestion is that...

Various contributions to the recent literature on congestion pricing have demonstrated that when services at a congestible facility are provided by operators with market power, the case in point often being a few airlines jointly using a congested airport, optimal congestion pricing rules...

We analyse congestion pricing in a road and rail network with heterogeneous users. On the road there is bottleneck congestion. In the train there is crowding congestion. We separately analyse "proportional heterogeneity" that varies the values of time and schedule delay scalarly in fixed...

The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert market power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion...