In this paper we analyse scoring auctions with general non-quasilinear scoring rules. We assume that cost function of each firm is additively separable in quality and type. In sharp contrast to the recent results in the literature we show the following. (i) Equilibria in scoring auctions can be...

We consider an organisation which has been allotted a fixed budget 'A' by higher authorities, for procuring certain specified items. It seeks price quotations from firms. The firm quoting the lowest price secures the contract to sell the item to the organisation. In this context we compare...

In this article we provide a brief survey of the literature on ‘scoring auctions’. We start with the benchmark model of the traditional auction theory and then proceed to the literature on scoring auctions. We first discuss the pioneering work of Che (1993) in detail. Then we review...

This paper analyses the incentives to adopt cost-reducing technology by firms in a horizontally differentiated industry. In our model there are several suppliers of a new technology. The extent of the cost reduction depends on the quality of the new technology. A firm has to buy the technology...

In this paper we analyse scoring auctions with general non-quasilinear scoring rules. We assume that cost function of each firm is additively separable in quality and type. In sharp contrast to the recent results in the literature we show the following. (i) Equilibria in scoring auctions can be...

In this paper we theoretically analyse effects of corruption in public procurements within a scoring-auction framework. A corrupt politician, who acts on behalf of the public sector, receives a kickback from the winning bidder. The politician selects the scoring rule. The paper shows that such...

This paper develops a model of determination of the unionized wage in the presence of both collective bargaining and an efficiency wage. The efficiency of each worker is positively related to both the wage and the unemployment rate in the economy. The unionized wage is greater than the...