The paper analyses the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in price competition (or Bertrand equilibrium) in a homogeneous product market when costs are strictly convex and proves that if output is demand determined such equilibrium always exists. This paper also characterises such...

In this paper we analyse the effects of third-degree price discrimination on output, profit and welfare in a symmetric cost duopoly. We provide sufficient conditions for output, profit and welfare to be higher (or lower) under third-degree price discrimination in a duopoly, compared with a...

In a simple homogeneous product setting, the paper looks at the debate on whether firms should choose quantity or price as their strategic variable. It examines a two-stage game between firms with symmetric costs in which the firms choose the strategic mode of operation in the first period and...

This paper examines some aspects of trade intervention in a 'reciprocal dumping' framework of international trade. It is shown, in the presence of increasing returns to scale, that certain conventional wisdom regarding the effect of trade policies need not hold true.

The present note develops a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets highlighting the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing dominant moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially. The existing...

We show here, in contrast to recent results, that if firms have different cost functions (that are strictly subadditive), such that the 'monopoly breakeven prices' are different, then in a homogeneous product duopoly there is always a Bertrand equilibrium (either in pure strategies or in mixed...

What is the role of human capital in the regional location of the software industry? Why did policy rate cuts in India not lead to a rapid lowering of the banks' lending rates in the context of the financial crises? How does women's education impact on patrilocal marriage and cultural norms?...

We consider a two good world where an individual i with income mi has utility function u(x,y), where x belongs to [0,infinity) and y belongs {0,1}. We first derive the valuation (maximum price that he is willing to pay for the object) for good y as a function of his income. Then we consider the...