This note analyzes constrained Pareto efficient nonlinear income tax schedules that are monotonic chains to the left. The main result demonstrates that if all individuals have a positive consumption at the tax schedule that maximizes the utility of the worst-off individual, then the constrained...

This paper considers two multi-item auction formats (ascending and sealed bid) which both identify the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where truthful preference revelation constitutes an equilibrium. Even though these auction formats share many theoretical properties, there are...

This paper characterizes nonlinear outlay schedules that are based on a cooperative surplus sharing game with transferable utility. First, the pricing game is shown to be convex and, as a consequence, to have a non-empty core. This is followed by a description of the necessary and sufficient...

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and...

The paper analyzes nonlinear tax schedules that are identified by maximizing a welfare function represented by a weighted summation of net utilities over a set of n=3 differing individuals. We demonstrate that some of the feasible and Pareto efficient tax schedules that satisfy self-selection...

This paper considers a house allocation problem with no initial ownership and where prices are bounded from below and above by exogenously given price restrictions. This type of housing market contains, e.g., the "assignment market" and the "student placement problem" as special cases. A...