Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants. -- contests ; merger

We study the mechanics of cartel enforcement and its interaction with bidding constraints in the context of repeated procurement auctions. Under collusion, bidding constraints weaken cartels by limiting the scope for punishment. This yields a test of collusive behavior exploiting the...

Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants.

In this paper, we consider a multi-unit Dutch auction over the Internet where auctioneer gradually decrements per unit price of the item during the course of the auction. We investigate an optimal price control problem of the auctioneer, that is, the problem of finding a decrementing price...