Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic incentives under limited commitment. It circumvents ratchet effects and facilitates the revelation of persistent private information through two effects: a play-hardball effect, which...

type="main" <p>Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic incentives under limited commitment. It circumvents ratchet effects and facilitates the revelation of persistent private information through two effects: a play-hardball...</p>

We study an organization with a top management (principal) and multiple subunits (agents) with private information that determine the organization\'s aggregate efficiency. Under centralization, eliciting the agents\' private information may induce the principal to manipulate aggregate...

We study an agency model with vertical hierarchy—the principal, the prime‐agent and the subagent. The principal faces a project that needs both agents' services. Due to costly communication, the principal receives a report only from the prime‐agent, who receives a report from the subagent....

We study the optimal hierarchical structure of an organization under limited commitment. The organization cannot make a long term commitment to wages and output levels, while it can commit to its hierarchical structure. We show that the optimal hierarchical structure is horizontal when it is...

An entrepreneur needs a lender's capital input to finance a project. The entrepreneur, who is privately informed about the project environment, provides a labor input (effort). Capital and labor are perfect complements. We show that the entrepreneur may optimally distort the project's...