In a model of career concerns for experts, when is a principal hurt from observing more information about their agent? This Paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent’s action and information directly on the agent’s action. When the latter kind of...

There is now extensive empirical evidence showing that fund managers have relative performance objectives and adapt their investment strategy in the last part of the calendar year to balance their performance in the early part of the year. Emphasis was, however, put on returns in excess of some...

In a common agency game a set of principals promises monetary transfers to an agent which depend on the action he will take. The agent then chooses the action, and is paid the corresponding transfers. Principals announce their transfers simultaneously. This game has many equilibria; Bernheim and...

In a common agency game, several principals try to in°uence the behavior of an agent. Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been identi¯ed by Bernheim and Whinston and has found widespread use in the political economy literature....

There is now extensive empirical evidence showing that fund managers have relative performance objectives and adapt their investment strategy in the last part of the calendar year to their performance in the early part of the year. However, emphasis was put on returns in excess of some exogenous...

We develop a methodology to collect and analyze data on CEOs' time use. The idea — sketched out in a simple theoretical set-up — is that CEO time is a scarce resource and its allocation can help us identify the firm's priorities as well as the presence of governance issues. We follow 94 CEOs...

We provide evidence on the match between firms, managers and incentives using a new survey designed for this purpose. The survey contains information on a sample of executives' risk preferences and human capital, on the explicit and implicit incentives they face and on the firms they work for....

Is there a link between Italy’s disappointing productivity growth and the way Italian firms select and develop managerial talent? We collect extensive information on the characteristics of Italian managers and of the firms that employ them. In particular, we analyze the incentive structure...

Organizational economics has advanced along two parallel tracks, one concerned with motivating agents with diverging objectives, the other - less developed - with coordinating agents with cognitive limits. This survey focuses on the second strand and on attempts to bring the two strands...

We provide evidence on the match between …rms, managers, and incentives using anew survey that contains information on managers' risk preferences and human capital,on their compensation schemes, and on the …rms they work for. The data is consistentwith the equilibrium correlations predicted by...