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In a model of career concerns for experts, when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent's action and information directly on the agent's action. When the latter kind of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884587
What are the equilibrium features of a market where a sizeable portion of traders face career concerns? This question is central to our understanding of Þnancial markets that are increasingly dominated by institutional investors. We construct a model of delegated portfolio management that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071126
Equilibrium of the housing market depends on a complex set of interactions between: (1) individual location decisions; (2) individual housing investment; (3) collective decisions on urban growth. We embed these three elements in a model of a dynamic economy with two sources of friction:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071149
Consider a standard single-agent quasilinear mechanism design problem with a potentially large type space. We wish to provide an upper bound to the principal’s payoff loss if she operates on the basis of a discrete approximation rather than the true type space. We show that, if the principal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071431
We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019200
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In a model of career concerns for experts, when is the principal hurt from observing more information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent's action and information directly on the agent's action. It is the latter kind that can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746006
Recent events in several countries have underscored the importance of good governance in private occupational pension plans. The present paper uses contract theory to analyze the interplay of residual claims and control rights in private pensions. The residual claimant is the plan sponsor in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746347