This paper characterizes equilibrium persuasion through selective disclosure based on the personal information that senders acquire about the preferences and orientations of receivers, with applications to strategic marketing and campaigning. We derive positive and normative implications...

We consider an economy where production generates externalities, which can be reduced by additional firm level expenditures. This requires fi rms to raise outside financing, leading to deadweight loss due to a standard agency problem vis-à-vis outside investors. Policy is constrained as fi rms...

Using personal data collected on the internet, fi rms and political campaigners are able to tailor their communication to the preferences and orientations of individual consumers and voters, a practice known as hypertargeting. This paper models hypertargeting as selective disclosure of...

We consider an economy where production generates externalities, which can be reduced by additional firm level expenditures. This requires firms to raise outside financing, leading to deadweight loss due to a standard agency problem vis-à-vis outside investors. Policy is constrained as firms...