An important question for firms in dynamic industries is how to induce a CEO to revealinformation that the firm should change its strategy, in particular when a strategy change might cause his own dismissal. We show that the uniquely optimal incentive scheme from this perspective consists of...

We consider the joint optimal design of CEOs severance pay and on-the-job pay in a modelin which the CEO has interim private information about the likely success of his strategy. The board faces a tradeoff between reducing the likelihood that the firm forgoes an efficient strategy change and...

As manufacturers often sell their products through retailers, many manufacturer cartels directly affect retailers, who are, at least in Europe, also increasingly claiming damages. This paper points to an, to our knowledge, hitherto unexplored aspect in such cases. As store brands (or private...

Economic evidence that seeks to evaluate the effect of an infringement is typically presented as a point-estimate of the effect along with its statistical significance. Such evidence alone, however, is often of little value to the judge, in particular if it is impossible for her to infer whether...

When manufacturers collude to raise wholesale prices for national brands, the input prices of store brands may not be directly affected, either as they are procured competitively from different sources or as retailers are vertically integrated. In this article we explore both conceptually and...

In this article the forgotten role of prices in the analysis of vertical effects is described. While at least some vertical restraints have the potential to entail anticompetitive harm, it is demonstrated that competition law may be overshooting the mark if no account is taken of both, the...

German Abstract: Der Aufsatz untersucht die wesentlichen Bestimmungsfaktoren von Preisschirmeffekten, die entstehen, wenn durch eine kartellinduzierte Preiserhöhung Nachfrage auf Substitute von Kartellaußenseitern umgelenkt wird. Solche Preisschirmeffekte entstehen unabhängig davon, ob die...

An important question for firms in dynamic industries is how to induce a CEO to reveal information that the firm should change its strategy, in particular when a strategy change might cause his own dismissal. We show that the uniquely optimal incentive scheme from this perspective consists of...

This paper argues that a commitment to 'shallow pockets', namely by limiting the size of funds raised initially, may improve an investor's ability to deal with entrepreneurial agency problems. Shallow pockets allow the investor to create competition for continuation finance between her portfolio...