Hat die heutige Finanzmarktkrise instabile Marktmechanismen oder mangelnde Regulierung als Ursache? Christoph Kaserer, Technische Universität München, sieht in einer Kombination aus einem Regulierungsversagen und einem ungelösten Moral-Hazard-Konflikt bei Finanzinstitutionen den Grund für...

We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local (e.g., relationship) lender has valuable soft, albeit private, information, which gives her a competitive advantage vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders who provide arm’s-length financing based on hard, publicly available...

We study a model in which a CEO can entrench himself by hiding information from the board that would allow the board to conclude that he should be replaced. Assuming that even diligent monitoring by the board cannot fully overcome the information asymmetry vis-à-vis the CEO, we ask if there is...