We study the relation between corporate governance and opportunistic timing of CEO option grants via backdating or otherwise. Our methodology focuses on how grant date prices rank within the price distribution of the grant month. During 1996-2005, about 12% of firms provided one or more lucky...

We examine the relation between institutional holdings and payout policy in U.S. public firms. We find that payout policy affects institutional holdings. Institutions avoid firms that do not pay dividends. However, among dividend-paying firms they prefer firms that pay fewer dividends. Our...

The 2001 to 2002 corporate scandals led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and to various amendments to the U.S. stock exchanges' regulations. We find that the announcement of these rules has a significant effect on firm value. Firms that are less compliant with the provisions of the rules earn positive...

In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, major U.S. stock exchanges issued new board requirements to enhance board oversight. We find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that were more affected by these requirements, compared with firms that were less affected, taking...

We document changes in board characteristics in public US firms between 1997 and 2003. We find significant changes in board independence, committee independence, board size, interlocking directorships, director occupation and multiple directorships. Most of the changes occur between 2000 and...

We study the market for CEO talent in public U.S. firms during the years 1993-2005. CEO talent pools are not homogenous across firms and industries. About 68% of new CEOs are former employees of their own firms (“insider CEOsâ€) and the rest come from outside the firm (“outsider...

We study the relation between opportunistic timing of option grants and corporate governance failures, focusing on "lucky" grants awarded at the lowest price of the grant month. Option grant practices were designed to provide lucky grants not only to executives but also to independent directors....