Renewable fixed-term contracts are widespread in executive compensation. This paper shows why these contracts are optimal and how they affect managers' and boards' behavior. When managers' match-quality changes over time, offering severance pay for premature dismissal can discourage window...

We show that uninformed speculative trading can benefit shareholders by helping targeted firms become intrinsically better. Speculators profit from inflating a firm's stock price, as that can help the firm attract high-quality stakeholders that might have not joined otherwise. This leads to a...

Do mandatory disclosure requirements make public firms less disruptive and competitive? Not necessarily. We offer a new perspective showing that mandatory disclosure facilitates "co-opetition" --- a strategy of competing on some dimensions while avoiding competition on others. Co-opetition...

The study sheds light on the stabilizing role of government budget. It finds that in Bulgaria both taxes and government spending are negatively related to the real growth rate. This leads to the conclusion that budgetary expenditure influence output in a non-Keynesian fashion. The size of...