Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that executive compensation is set by CEOs themselves rather than boards on behalf of shareholders, since many features of observed pay packages may appear inconsistent with standard optimal contracting theories. However, it may be that simple models do not capture...

We document a significant investment bank fixed effect in the announcement returns of an Mamp;A deal. The inter-quartile range of bank fixed effects is 1.26%, compared to a full-sample average return of 0.72%. The results remain significant after controlling for the component of returns...

This paper analyzes how blockholders can exert governance even if they cannot intervene in a firm's operations. Blockholders have strong incentives to monitor the firm's fundamental value, since they can sell their stakes upon negative information. By trading on private information (following...

Existing theories advocate the exclusive use of equity-like instruments in executive compensation. However, recent empirical studies document the prevalence of debt-like instruments such as pensions. This paper justifies the use of debt as efficient compensation. Inside debt is a superior...

Blanket exclusion of "brown" stocks is seen as the best way to reduce their negative externalities, by starving them of capital and hindering their expansion. We show that a more effective strategy may be tilting -- holding a brown stock if it is best-in-class, i.e. has taken a corrective...

The academic finance profession has the potential to be uniquely purposeful due to four characteristics – the freedom to take risks and work on what we’re passionate about, the loyalty to our profession rather than just our institution, the collaborative nature of the creation and...

The Review of Finance aimed to significantly increase its standards over my 6 years as Managing Editor and 1 year as Editor. To comply with these new standards, I had to reject nearly 1,000 manuscripts. This article aims to use these rejections constructively by distilling common reasons for...