Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social...

We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on strategic complementarities and strategic unraveling. We identify a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers. As a consequence, an...

This paper inspires from a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. We introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From one period to another, teachers can either retain their...

We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on strategic complementarities and strategic unraveling. We identify a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers. As a consequence, an...

This paper considers a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. Inspired by this situation, we introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From one period to another, agents are...

The aim of this paper is to characterise the set of non regular economies, when there is a finite number of consumers with either finite or infinitely many goods. We prove that the structure of the equilibrium set is the same in both cases and that there exist bifurcations in some of these models.

The aim of this paper if to characterize the set of singular economies, when there are a finite set of consumers with infinitely many goods in the sense that goods differ in the time which they are consumed or in the state of the world in which they become available. There exist l available...

We consider a pure exchange economy, where agent's consumption spaces are Banach spaces, goods are contingent in time of states of the world, the utility function of each agent is not necessarily a separable function, but increasing, quasiconcave, and twice Frechet differentiable over the...

In this paper we show that in a pure exchange economy it is possible to improve the social welfare along an e±cient path. This path will be called the Negishi map. Moving the relative weights of the agent in a social welfare utility function, we obtain an e±cient path of allocations and social...