This paper was presented as the Agricultural and Resource Economics Hibbard Lecture on 12 April 1996 at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. It is stored as a postscript file, which is viewable in an external viewer like ghostscript.

Juries charged with evaluating economic policy alternatives are the focus of this study. The recruitment and management of juries is a principal–agent problem involving the design of incentive mechanisms for participation and truthful revelation of values. This paper considers a simple general...

This paper surveys economic choice theory, stressing developments that permit use of data from psychometric and conjoint experiments to produce market demand forecasts. Alternatives to the widely used multinomial logit model are summarized, and a new method for estimating multinomial probits is...

We study the consequences of imposing a minimum coverage in an insurance market where enrollment is mandatory and agents have private information on their true risk type. If the regulation is not too stringent, the equilibrium is separating in which a single firm monopolizes the high risks while...

This expository paper describes the factors that contribute to failure of health insurance markets, and the regulatory mechanisms that have been and can be used to combat these failures. Standardized contracts and creditable coverage mandates are discussed, along with premium support, enrollment...