Many companies spend substantial resources in order to be viewed as socially responsible. We argue that one reason firms do this is to create a warm glow about the firm and thereby affect employee behavior and improve performance. This proposition is tested with an incomplete contract...

We conjecture that a firm’s organization capital (OC) has a substitution effect on its executive pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) and empirically document a robust and significant substitution effect of OC on executive PPS. We use state-level unemployment insurance benefits as an...

This paper examines the length of time over which CEO performance is evaluated (the “performance period”) in CEO performance-based equity awards (PBEAs). Departing from the primary emphasis of agency theory on moral hazard problems, we develop a model in which short performance periods are...

In this study, we integrate the insights of consumption value theory and the crowdfunding literature to develop a value-based view of crowdfunding rewards to systematically theorize and synthesize the underlying mechanisms through which the various rewards offered by crowdfunding projects can...

This paper seeks to explore how an agent's incentives to perform influences her performance. We analyze this question in a simple principal-agent model, where the agent chooses how much effort to invest and which project to implement. We show that the relationship between the incentives to...

An effective performance-based compensation system must increase the probability of high performance corporate outcomes in order to justify the incremental expense relative to a straight salary system. A positive relation between current performance and current compensation indicates that the...