This paper tests for asymmetric information problems between the lead arranger and participants in a lending syndicate. One problem comes from adverse selection, whereby the lead has a private informational advantage over participants. A second problem comes from moral hazard, whereby the lead...

We present a theoretical model of moral hazard and adverse selection in an imperfectly competitive loans market that is suitable for application to Africa. The model allows for variation in both the level of contract enforcement (depending on the quality of governance) and the degree of market...

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

This article describes the anatomy of health insurance. It begins by considering the optimal design of health insurance policies. Such policies must make tradeoffs appropriately between risk sharing on the one hand and agency problems such as moral hazard (the incentive of people to seek more...

Prevention ranges from medical decisions such as vaccinations and clinical preventive services delivered during periodic health examinations to private health lifestyle decisions such as regular exercise and non-smoking. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of economic issues that...