The paper considers a duopoly model in which firms inherited asymmetric market shares and history-based price discrimination is viable. However, firms can identify only a share of their own consumers depending to the degree of information accuracy. We derive the pricing strategies and we analyze...

According to Chang et al. (2013), social welfare under licensing is lower than under no-licensing if the R&D efficiency is high. We show that this result is not correct, as when R&D efficiency is high social welfare is higher under licensing than under no-licensing.

This article analyses the pricing policy equilibria emerging in a duopoly when one firm may choose whether to engage in behaviour-based price discrimination or uniform pricing while the rival price discriminates. The question we address is: should a firm price discriminate when facing a price...

The circular city model and the linear city model are extended to allow for asymmetric directional transportation costs. A two-stage location-then-quantity model is proposed. We show that in the circular city model, maximal dispersion arises in equilibrium, while in the linear city model, the...

This article investigates the optimal licensing mechanism in a spatial model where competitors set quantities and one firm owns a cost-reducing innovation. We show that when the firms spatially discriminate, the innovator gets higher profits by licensing through royalties instead than through a...

Adopting a general spatial framework, we analyse collusion concerning a price increase between two firms. We find that any variable affects the sustainability of collusion in the same way it affects the competitive profits. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012