We show in a game-theoretic model that when quantity-setting firms first choose whether to discriminate or not and then set quantities, the unique equilibrium consists in all firms selling a uniform quantity to all consumers. This sharply contrasts with the case of price-setting firms.

I introduce non-perfect substitutability between products into the spatial Bertrand model. I show that if goods are complements, the firms always agglomerate. If goods are substitutes, the firms agglomerate if the transportation costs are not too high. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg...

We study the impact of space on perfect collusion sustainability within the unidirectional Hotelling model where the firms are constrained to move to the left. We obtain that when the firm that located to the left of the Hotelling segment has the greater incentive to deviate, the distance...

In the Hotelling framework, the equilibrium first-degree discriminatory prices are all lower than the equilibrium uniform price. When firms’ locations are fixed, price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibrium in a game in which every firm may commit not to discriminate before setting...