This paper presents a model where income distribution and redistributive fiscal policy interact to affect the budget deficit and the pattern of net borrowing of a country. According to the standard representative agent paradigm, a small open economy should smooth consumption by borrowing from...

In the context of recent research in political economy, this paper addresses the policy problem of fiscal consolidation in terms of three types of issues: 1) the macroeconomic effects of alternative strategies to consolidate; 2) the institutional setups conducive to a consolidation; and 3) the...

This paper considers budget expansions and adjustments in OECD countries in the last three decades. Our main results are: i) on average fiscal expansions are the results of increases in expenditures, particularly of transfer programs, while contractions are typically due to tax increases; ii)...

By discussing the available theoretical and empirical literature, this paper argues that budget procedures and budget institutions do influence budget outcomes. Budget institutions include both procedural rules and balanced budget laws. We critically assess theoretical contributions in this area...

We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We present a model emphasizing the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are...

We estimate the effect of exogenous changes in taxes on the US unemployment rate and on several other labor market variables. Our estimates are based on a revised version of the Romer and Romer (2010) narrative record of exogenous tax innovations, with the additional benefit of distinguishing...

During a fiscal stimulus, does it matter, for the size of the government spending multiplier, which category of agents bears the brunt of the current and/or future adjustment in taxes? In an economy with heterogeneous agents and imperfect financial markets, the answer depends on whether or not...

With perfect credit markets, any (lump-sum) tax redistribution is neutral. We study the e¤ects of a tax redistribution in an economy with heterogenous agents and borrowing constraints. Under ?exible prices, a tax redistribution that favors "the poor" (i.e., the credit constrained) is neutral,...