This paper shows how the optimal financial structure of a firm complements incentive schemes to discipline managers, and how the securities' return streams determine the claimholders' incentives to intervene in management. The theory rationalizes (1) the multiplicity of securities, (2) the...

We propose a new theory of predation based on "signal-jamming." In our model the predator's characteristics are common knowledge, while the entrant is uncertain of his own future profitability. The entrant uses his current profit to decide whether to remain in the market, and the predator preys...

We develop a model of unregulated competition between interconnected networks and analyze the mature and transition phases of the industry in this deregulated environment. Networks pay (negotiated or regulated) access charges to each other and compete in prices for customers. We show that a...

Systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank's economic distress to other economic agents linked to that bank through financial transactions. Banking authorities often prevent systemic risk through an implicit insurance of interbank claims, or by reducing interbank transactions and...

Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed, platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and the Internet, must "get both sides of the market on board." Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to their business model, that...

This paper analyzes the organization of the R&D activity in an incomplete contract framework. It provides theoretical foundations to understand how the allocation of property rights on innovations may affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations; to rationalize commonly...

We analyze the value placed by rational agents on self-confidence, and the strategies employed in its pursuit. Confidence in one's abilities generally enhances motivation, making it a valuable asset for individuals with imperfect willpower. This demand for self-serving beliefs (which can also...

This paper argues that parties regulate competition among like-minded factions so as to enhance reputation building by, and voter trust in, the politicians standing for a given cause. While intra- and interparty competition contributes to keeping politicians on their toes, unbridled competition...