In this paper, we study many-to-one matching (hospital-intern markets) with an aftermarket. We analyze the Nash equilibria of capacity allocation games, in which preferences of hospitals and interns are common knowledge and every hospital determines a quota for the regular market given its total...

This paper studies optimal money growth in a cash-in-advance production economy with heterogeneity in patience levels and know-how. We show that the rate of deflation suggested by the Friedman rule is limited by the subjective discount rate of the most patient agent in the economy. The output...

In this paper we examine the welfare effects of government's preferences over consumption and investment spending under different methods of financing in a two-period OLG model. The government has a utility function defined over the decomposition of her spending over two periods and raises funds...

In this paper, we model college admissions under early decision in a many-to-one matching framework with two periods. We show that there exists no stable matching system, involving an early decision matching rule and a regular decision matching rule, which is nonmanipulable via early decision...

In this paper, we study the long-played, yet until now unmodeled, college admissions game over early admissions plans using a many-to-one matching framework. We characterize the equilibrium strategies of each college involving its early quota out of its total capacity, and the set of admissible...

The aim of this paper is to scrutinize whether the equilibrium exchange rate framework could contribute to the understanding of misalignments in the real exchange rate in Turkey and whether this could be used as a guideline for policy interventions by the monetary authorities. Estimation results...

This paper unifies the theories of Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation in a single framework. Environments considered are such that each agent's characteristics include, in addition to a specification of his private information, a commonly known type parameter, while both attributes...

We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the designer or the society is the only framework, among...

We characterize the monetary competitive equilibrium in a two-country monetary union model involving cash-in-advance constraints both in the factor markets and in the good markets. Simulations show that common money inflation in the union have asymmetric effects on the welfare of workers in the...