If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents\' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results...

The literature on partnership dissolution generally takes the dissolution decision as given and examines whether the outcome is efficient. A well-known result is that <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$k+1$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <mi>k</mi> <mo>+</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-price auctions dissolve a partnership efficiently when the share structure is sufficiently close to equal....</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...

This paper revisits the licensing of a non–drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning...

This paper revisits the standard analysis of licensing a cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers of the auction the option to sign a royalty...

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer’s problem is to select a subset of maximal...

This paper evaluates how R&D subsidies to the business sector are typically awarded. We identify two sources of ine_ciency: the selection based on a ranking of individual projects, rather than complete allocations, and the failure to induce competition among applicants in order to extract and...

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.

We study decision making processes with non-standard all-pay structures. In our first group of applications, individual members of some institution—due to public pressure or expectation—propose reductions of their own income, e.g., corporate board members reducing their bonus payments in an...