This paper considers a dynamic North South model of international trade and innovations in which firms can endogenously bias the direction of technological change. We show that, when there is a differential degree of protection of property rights between the two regions, innovating firms face a...

This paper proposes an analysis of the links between the internal organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face agency costs. These agency costs are due to the existence of asymmetries of information and the formation of internal...

We study the degree of corruption in a hierarchical model of government. In particular, we explore the question of whether adding a layer of government simply increases the total amount of corruption or generates an organizational efficiency (via a principal-agent relationship between levels of...

Cultural transmission mechanisms which favor the direct transmission of the parents traits to their children may be adaptative to natural selection when opposed to mechanisms in which the parents choose for the offspring the highest fitness at any time. This is so, in particular, in environments...

We consider an economy where property rights are necessary to ensure sufficient rewards to ex ante investments. Because enforcement of property rights influence the ex post distribution of rents, there is room for corruption. We characterize the optimal organization of the society and optimal...

This paper analyzes the links between the internal organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face dynamic agency costs. These agency costs are due to the formation of vertical collusions within the organization. To respond to the...