Le modele presente dans cet article est base sur l'idee que l'education augmente la productivite et la participation politique des citoyens. Une oligarchie capitaliste est supposee detenir initialement le pouvoir dans une economie en developpement ou la masse des travailleurs est peu eduquee....

We present a simple model to analyze law enforcement problems in transition economies. Law enforcement implies coordination problems and multiplicity of equilibria due to a law abidance and a fiscal externality. We analyze two institutional mechanisms for solving the coordination problem. A...

This paper presents a simple model of the links between education, democratization and economic developmnet. In a context of imperfect capital markets, we investigate the incentives for a capitalist oligarchy to subsidize the education of poor workers and to initiate a political transition.

This paper analyzes how political institutions, wealth distribution and economic activities affect each other during the process of development. A simple general equilibrium model of rent-seeking political elites with two productive sectors (modern and traditional) is presented.