In this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too...

We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are sufficiently well-paid, difficult to bribe and corruption detection highly probable, we show that...

This paper argues that the internal organization of the firm and the growth process interact strongly to determine simultaneously the power of incentives within the firm and the growth rate of the economy. We show how agents within the firm can invest either by using their own human capital or...

This paper presents a simple model where micro-founded dynamics of cultural identity are endogenous and interact with an international trade equilibrium. This process generates a strong home bias under autarky. We then show that goods market integration causes a phenomenon of cultural...

This paper proposes a model to shed light on two important policy features of privatization in Central and Eastern Europe: the idea of a necessary critical mass of privatization on the one hand, and the difficulties encountered in the actual privatization process on the other, related to the...

This Paper investigates the links between the nature of contractual relationships within firms, the strength of information flows spreading between firms and the dynamics of technological competition. At the firm level, we focus on the corporate incentives to design Knowledge Management policies...