optimal. In the infinitely-repeated version of the model, it is also possible for the parties to enter a relational contract …, under which each promises not to engage in rent-seeking. Such a contract must be self-enforcing, for it cannot be enforced … by court. It is shown that integration makes the relational contract less easily sustainable, as, due to its cost …

In this paper, we consider a symmetric rent-seeking contest, where employees lobby for a governmental contract on … behalf of firms. The only verifiable information is which firm is assigned the contract. We derive the optimal wage contracts … of the employees and analyze, whether commitment by determining the wage contract prior to the competitor is profitable …

We study the optimal duration of contracts in a principal-agent framework with both moral hazard and adverse selection …. Agents decide on a contract-specific and non-verifiable investment. Incentive compatibility requires that initial contracts …

In public procur ement a temporal separation between award and actual contract allows private entrepreneurs who did not …

of contract employees …

course leads to less rent seeking. Finally, a longer contract makes a possible cooperation between the firms solving the rent …In this paper, firms engage in rent seeking in order to be assigned a governmental contract. We analyze how a change in … the contract length affects the firms' rent-seeking behavior. A longer contract leads to more rent seeking at a contract …

course leads to less rent seeking. Finally, a longer contract makes a possible cooperation between the .rms solving the rent …In this paper, .rms engage in rent seeking in order to be assigned a governmental contract. We analyze how a change in … the contract length a¤ects the .rms. rent-seeking behavior. A longer contract leads to more rent seeking at a contract …