We argue that trust can be incentivised by measures which increase the ability of trusters to protect themselves against risk. We work within the framework originally established by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) in which trust is measured experimentally as the ability to generate reciprocity...

The paper deals with the literature on social evolution.

This paper explores the quantitative relation between non-random, assortative matching and the maintenance of cooperative behavior under evolutionary dynamics.

This paper addresses coalition government formation. We formulate a model that dresses why and when coalition governments from that include more than the minimum number of parties required for the majority.

This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implement social choice functions in the traditional sense. Will the agents actually play the equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study the dynamic implementation of the first-best solution for the so-called King...

In the literature on vertical relations little attention has been paid to the tole of strategic uncertainty, that is, the presence of multiple self-enforcing outcomes which might lead to coordination failure. However, if firms have some degree of freedom in designing the industrial relations...

A hostage with respect to an action of a player is defined here to be an amount ofpayoff that will be placed in the opponent's possession if the player takes the action. Whereas the only Nash equilibrium for a prisoner's dilemma game is mutual defection, it is shown that there are at most two...