We study the service commitment strategy and pricing decisions in a single-supplier single-retailer supply chain where all the players (and consumers) are risk averse. Motivated by various industrial practices, we explore the case where the retailer determines whether to provide a service...

One of the characteristics of the fashion marketplace is the unpredictability and apparent randomness of fashion hits. Another one is the information asymmetry among consumers. In this paper, we consider fashion as a means consumers use to signal belonging to a higher social rank and propose an...

The approach to decision theory has varied from one scholar and school of thought to the other from the development of mathematically complex systems, models and equations to the disregard of this particular academic endeavor altogether due to randomness and overwhelming subjectivity and...

Pacific sardine (Sardinops sagax) is a transboundary fish stock exploited by Mexican, US and Canadian fisheries that exhibits extreme fluctuations in its abundance and geographic distribution corresponding to water temperature regime shifts within the California Current Ecosystem. In this study,...

The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to...

A general framework is suggested to describe human decision making in a certain class of experiments performed in a trading laboratory. We are in particular interested in discerning between two different moods, or states of the investors, corresponding to investors using fundemental investment...

We consider a supply channel composed of one manufacturer and two symmetric retailers. Three cases are studied. The non-cooperation case is a leader-follower relationship. The manufacturer determines his spending in national advertising and the wholesale price. Then, retailers determine...

Costly signaling is a mechanism through which the honesty of signals can be secured in equilibrium, even in interactions where communicators have conflicting interests. This paper explores the dynamics of one such signaling game: Spence’s model of education. It is found that separating...

This study presents a more general collusive mechanism that is sustainable in an oligopolistic repeated game. In this setup, firms can obtain average payoffs beyond the cooperative profits while at the same time improve consumer welfare through a lower market price offer. In particular, we...