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experiment that analyzes the influence of other-regarding preferences on sorting and incentives. Experimental evidence shows that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319186
in performance. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self-select into … enter a tournament instead of a piece-rate payment scheme, the average effort is higher and the between-subject variance is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014255631
We study the determinants of biases in subjective performance evaluations in an MTurk experiment to test the … implications of a standard formal framework of rational subjective evaluations. In the experiment, subjects in the role of workers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013345894
We analyze the role of worker participation for the success of minimum remuneration policies. In our experiments employers remunerate workers doing a real-effort task. We vary the way how a minimum remuneration policy is introduced. In the worker-participation treatment, workers bargain with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011237
tournament-based scheme vs. a fixed pay scheme. The experiment allows for the measurement of creative productivity, risk … fundamentally from previously found patterns. Agents did not self-select into the tournament scheme according to their creative … most creative agents into the tournament is that there exist substantial misjudgments of relative creative productivity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024136
We conduct a real-effort experiment to test whether workers reciprocate generous wages by managers when workers are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021527
Previous literature documents that mutual funds' flows increase more than linearly with realized performance. I show this convex flow-performance relationship is consistent with a dynamic contracting model in which investors learn about the fund manager's skill. My model predicts that flows...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012860014
A principal decides when to exercise a real option. A biased agent influences this decision by strategically disclosing information. Committing to disclose all information with delay is the optimal way to persuade the principal to wait. Without dynamic commitment, this promise is credible only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864710
We develop a theory of conversations. Two agents with different interests take turns choosing the topic of the conversation. Talking about a single topic allows them to delve deeper, making the conversation more informative (or enjoyable). To capture this dynamic, we assume that the marginal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013543005
tournament. According to the standard approach, rational agents should completely disregard the performance feedback of self …In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in … underreporting many principals seem to exhibit lying aversion which renders their feedback informative. Therefore, the agents respond …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003646717