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Agents frequently interact with multiple principals at the same time. An employee may have multiple supervisors, firms may engage in public-private partnerships or firms and individuals may borrow from multiple banks/peers. Digitalization further fuels the possibilities to simultaneously engage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213985
We focus on the relationship between a player's effort provision and tournament heterogeneity in a setting where … substitutes. To discriminate between the two models, we conduct a laboratory experiment where subjects participate in a real … relatively heterogeneous. In these laboratory data, the level of effort provision is independent of tournament heterogeneity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014169310
games increases over time. -- Cooperation ; experiment ; contracts ; indenture ; reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003793109
Principals can attempt to get agents to perform certain actions preferable to the principal by using ex-post punishments or rewards to align incentives. Field data is mixed on whether, and to what extent, such informal incentive contracting crowds out efficient solutions to the agency problem....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053260
We experimentally test the efficacy of indenture as a self-enforced contract device. In an indenture game, the principal signals the intention of payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent half of it as "prepayment"; the agent receives the completing half after delivering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206562
We conducted a lab experiment to examine (1) whether luck-based income influences honesty in a subsequent, unrelated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015179216
In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013012566
We model a managerial decision environment in which a manager both determines the skill heterogeneity of her workers and determines whether to retain or delegate the ability to allocate tasks. The manager prefers delegating when uncertainty is sufficiently high relative to the incentive conflict...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924939
administered incentives. -- principal agent ; experiment ; specific human capital …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472
Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitability. We model this learning as a two-armed bandit problem and highlight the interaction between learning (experimentation) and production. We derive the optimal contract for both experimentation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926023