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Sequential procurement with contractual and experimental learning

Gur, Yonatan; Macnamara, Gregory; Saban, Daniela - 2019

We study the design of sequential procurement strategies that integrate stochastic and strategic information. We consider a buyer who repeatedly demands a certain good and is unable to commit to long-term contracts. In each time period, the buyer makes a price offer to a seller who has private,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065183

Dynamic performance evaluation with deadlines : the role of commitment

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017

We consider an environment in which a principal hires an agent and evaluates his productivity over time in an ongoing relationship. The problem is embedded in a continuoustime model with both hidden action and hidden information, where the principal must induce the agent to exert effort to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011756012

Contracts that Reward Innovation : Delegated Experimentation with an Informed Principal

Sun, Yiman - 2018

We examine the nature of contracts that optimally reward innovations in a risky environment, when the innovator is privately informed about the quality of her innovation and must engage an agent to develop it. We model the innovator as a principal who has private but imperfect information about...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932065

Hierarchical experimentation

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2015

We consider a bandit problem faced by a team of two heterogeneous players. The team is hierarchical in that one (the principal) retains the exclusive right to terminate the project while the other (the agent) focuses strictly on implementing the project assigned to him. As a key departure, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343543

Preemptive behavior in sequential tournaments

Jost, Peter-J.; Kräkel, Matthias - 2000

sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001502463

Preemptive behavior in sequential tournaments

Jost, Peter-J.; Kräkel, Matthias - 2000

sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335241

What drives motivated agents? : the "right" mission or sharing it with the principal

Koppel, Hannes; Regner, Tobias - 2015

Motivated agents are characterized by increasing their effort if their work generates not only a monetary return for them but also a benefit for a mission they support. While their motivation may stem from working for their preferred (i.e., the `right') mission, it may also be the principal's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401176

Tournaments with gaps

Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - 2013

A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents' performance is measured on a cardinal scale …, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best … performing agent must beat the second best to receive the winner prize. We analyze a tournament with two risk averse agents …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198511

Relative performance pay in the shadow of crisis

Kräkel, Matthias; Nieken, Petra - 2013

predictions in a laboratory experiment. The results confirm the effort ranking but show that in a severe crisis individuals …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198988

Relative performance pay in the shadow of crisis

Kräkel, Matthias; Nieken, Petra - In: European economic review : EER 74 (2015), pp. 244-268

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522645