behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm … the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages, which mitigates the sabotage problem …

non-routine task and identify the importance of these behavioral aspects. In a natural field experiment (n>1 …

-routine task and identify the importance of these behavioral aspects. In a field experiment (n>1,700 participants), we vary the …

-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … the production period, and continuously updated feedback. The pay schemes are a piece rate payment scheme and a winner …

-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … the production period, and continuously updated feedback. The pay schemes are a piece rate payment scheme and a winner …

behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm … the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages, which mitigates the sabotage problem …

against each other. In a computerized lab experiment with minimal group design, we prime subjects to two alternative …

behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm … the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages, which mitigates the sabotage problem … curbs sabotage due to agreements on flat prize structures and increased output. -- Sabotage ; tournament ; reciprocity …

-order tournament. Team members compete in their efforts for the right to propose the distribution of a prize within the team. The … proposer rotates in the order of members' efforts. We show in an experiment that tournaments elicit higher efforts than random …

experiment that varies freelance professionals’ incentives to attract attention about scientific findings, with several online …