avoidance in a real-effort setting. Our experiment offers three main results. First, we confirm that preferences for avoidance …

three questions: 1) As the size of a tournament grows through replication (i.e. at any level as the number of large prizes … tournament is held fixed, what happens to effort levels as the fraction of large prizes in it changes? 3) If dicrimination exists … within a tournament in the sense that a fraction, of the workers are discriminated against by having to significantly …

characterized by high degrees of time pressure affects individuals' self-selection. At this aim we run a lab-in-the-field experiment …

experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals …

three mechanisms with the appropriate distribution of prizes. We test the model's predictions in a laboratory experiment and …

We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different … tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top and at the bottom induces the highest effort, especially in larger …