By conducting a natural field experiment, we test whether a managerial policy of allowing employees to self …

We conduct a real-effort experiment to test whether workers reciprocate generous wages by managers when workers are …

-effort experiment, we examine how dishonesty and effort evolve in two rounds of competitions in which subjects are matched with …

This paper reports the results of an individual real effort laboratory experiment where subjects are paid for measured …

We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift-exchange wage and the effect of the worker …

We conducted a lab experiment with 253 participants to examine how constraints on bonus akin to bonus regulations, such …

-effort experiment, we examine how cheating and effort evolve in two rounds of competitions in which subjects compete with different …

We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different … tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top and at the bottom induces the highest effort, especially in larger …

Managers often use tournament incentive schemes which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the … levels for three tournament incentive schemes: reward tournaments, punishment tournaments, and tournaments combining reward … and punishment. We test the model s predictions in a laboratory experiment and find that the combination of reward and …