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Gürtler, Oliver; Struth, Lennart; Thon, Max - 2022

that the agents face. We study a tournament model and we find that more intense competition, measured by the number of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013337710

Competition and risk-taking

Gürtler, Oliver; Struth, Lennart; Thon, Max - 2022 - Updated version

that the agents face. We study a tournament model and we find that more intense competition, measured by the number of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013438624

Job mission as a substitute for monetary incentives : experimental evidence

Cassar, Lea - 2014

laboratory experiment in which the choice of the job characteristics (i.e., the mission) is part of the compensation package that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010414760

Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract : Experimental Evidence

Hoppe, Eva I. - 2009

report about an experiment with 508 participants designed to test whether this fundamental trade-off is actually relevant. In …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012718247

Cooperation in public goods games: Enhancing effects of group identity and competition

Horstmann, Elaine; Blankenberg, Ann-Kathrin; Schneider, Tim - 2017

A lot of economic and social situations can be described as contests in which agents need to distribute scare resources. Individual behavior plays an important role within these situations, while identity strongly impacts on behavior. This paper asks how group identity impacts the provision of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011732431

Do output-dependent prizes alleviate the sabotage problem in tournaments?

Glökler, Thomas; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-20

We investigate whether tournament prizes that depend on joint output ("variable prize tournaments") can alleviate the … sabotage problem which is otherwise inherent in tournament struc- tures. In a game-theoretical model with three contestants, we … the incen- tives to sabotage in a fixed-prize tournament may be counteracted in a variable-prize tournament such that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418051

Motivating Informed Decisions

Zambrano, Andres - 2015

This paper studies a principal-agent model where a risk-neutral principal delegates to a risk-neutral agent the decision of whether to pursue a risky project or a safe one. The return from the risky project is unknown and the agent can acquire costly unobservable information about it before...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027640

Robust Incentives for Information Acquisition

Carroll, Gabriel D. - 2013

A principal needs to make a decision. An expert is able to supply information that is helpful to the principal, but only by exerting effort, which is costly. The principal can incentivize the expert to put in effort by paying him a reward based on his reported information and on the true state...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086961

Randomization in contracts with endogenous information

Terstiege, Stefan - 2011

I consider a situation, where the agent can acquire payoff-relevant information either before or after the contract is signed. To raise efficiency, the principal might solicit information; to retain all surplus, however, she must prevent precontractual information gathering. The following class...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009126069

Competing to Persuade a Rationally Inattentive Agent

Jain, Vasudha - 2020

two senders, inwhich the receiver may garble each sender's experiment, subject to a cost increasing inthe informativeness …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848500