Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of variable pay if certain triggering conditions are met. As a result of regulatory responses to financial crises and corporate scandals as well as of growing shareholder pressure to...

We study the impact of the size of a firm's board of directors on managerial incentives. We present a model where a risk-averse agent (the top management team) performs multiple tasks for a firm that is controlled by multiple principals (the board of directors) who differ in the relative value...

We consider relational contracts for teams in which the agents monitor each other. We demonstrate that providing rents to the agents strengthens peer sanction endowed within the agents' ongoing relationship, which may have a negative effect to induce unproductive collusion as well as a positive...

This paper examines whether the risk-taking incentives induced by performance-based vesting (p-v) compensation influence bank loan contracting and credit ratings. Consistent with our risk-shifting hypothesis, we find that the p-v based compensation, as measured by the proportion of grant date...

We study the managers' compensation schemes adopted by publicly listed family firms by means of a theoretical model and an empirical analysis. Existing empirical literature finds puzzling evidence about the structure of family CEOs' pay, which apparently contradicts the fundamental tenets of...

We analyze the expected value of information about an agent's type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent's type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the...

The standard principal agent model considers monetary incentives only. It is assumed that money is more efficient than other forms of material, non-monetary compensation. Awards in the form of titles, orders, medals and honors (prizes) - though almost omnipresent - have so far escaped the...

Explicit relative performance awards (RPE) have become an important component of executive compensation. We calculate the value and incentives of explicit RPE awards and find that RPE awards that use a custom peer group are structured both in terms of the peer group and payout design to filter...

Recent studies have shown that the congruence (i.e. value relevance) of accounting earnings-based measures of performance (e.g., earnings, residual income) has been declining significantly over an extended period of time. We confirm this prior finding, and examine the implications of poor...

This study examines the effect of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on firm performance and risk-taking behavior. Agency theory suggests that RPE use in executive compensation plans improves risk sharing and strengthens incentive alignment when firm performance is exposed to common shocks. I...