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An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These quot;conformistsquot; have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too....
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We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...
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We study the performance effects of payment schemes for freelancers offering services on an online platform in an RCT. Under the initial scheme, the firm pays workers a pure sales commission. The intervention reduces the commission rate and adds a fixed payment per processed order to insure...
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We study the role of employees' identification to the employer for wage growth. We first show in a formal model that identification implies countervailing effects: Employees with higher identification are more valuable as they exert higher efforts, but have weaker bargaining positions, and less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824439
A central question in designing optimal policies concerns the assignment of individuals with different observable characteristics to different treatments. We study this question in the context of increasing workers' performance by using targeted incentives based on measurable worker...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013292419
A simple principal agent problem is experimentally investigated in which a principal repeatedly sets a wage and an agent responds by choosing an effort level. The principal's payoff is determined by the agent's effort. In a first setting, the principal can only set a fixed wage in each period....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318252
We derive a natural definition of responsibility in a formal model where employees care for their career prospects: A superior holds a subordinate responsible for a task, when she announces her beliefs that this subordinate contributes most to this task. We show, that those announced beliefs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318853